University of Michigan Law School

University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository
Book Chapters

Faculty Scholarship

2005

Closing the International Tax Gap
Joseph Guttentag
Reuven S. Avi-Yonah

University of Michigan Law School, aviyonah@umich.edu

Available at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/book_chapters/70

Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/book_chapters
Part of the Banking and Finance Law Commons, Taxation-Transnational Commons, and the Tax Law
Commons

Publication Information & Recommended Citation
Guttentag, Joseph. "Closing the International Tax Gap." Reuven Avi-Yonah, co-author. In Bridging the Tax
Gap: Addressing the Crisis in Federal Tax Administration, edited by M. B. Sawicky, 99-110. Washington,
D.C.: Economic Policy Institute, 2005.

This Book Chapter is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Scholarship at University of Michigan
Law School Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Book Chapters by an authorized
administrator of University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact
mlaw.repository@umich.edu.

CHAPTERS

Closing the international tax gap
by Joseph Guttentag and Reuven Avi-Yonah1

In July of 1999, the Justice Department entered into a plea bargain with
one John M. Mathewson of San Antonio, Texas. Mr. Mathewson was
accused of money laundering through the Guardian Bank and Trust Co.
Ltd., a Cayman Islands bank. Mr. Mathewson was chairman and con
trolling shareholder of Guardian, and in that capacity had access to in
formation on its depositors.

In return for a reduced sentence, Mr.

Mathewson turned over the names of the persons who had accounts at
Guardian. The result was an eye-opener: The majority of the accounts
were beneficially owned by U.S. citizens, and the reason they used a
Caymans bank had nothing to do with laundering funds earned in crimi
nal activities. Instead, the accounts were in the Caymans for the pur
pose of evading federal income taxes on income earned legally, relying
on the Caymans' lack of an income tax and promise of bank secrecy.
The IRS ultimately settled 1,165 cases with the individual taxpayers for

$3.2 billion-an average
1999 and Blum 2005).

a total collection of
payer (Massey

of

$1.7

million per tax

Guardian's U.S. clients relied on four simple realities. First, in
today's world, anyone can open a bank account in the Caymans for
a minimal fee over the Internet, without leaving the comfort of their
home. Second, the account can be opened in the name of a Cay
mans corporation, which can likewise be set up long-distance for
minimal transaction costs (as evident from any perusal of the back
pages of The Economist magazine, where law firms advertising such
services abound).

Third, money can be transferred into the account

electronically from the United States or from abroad, and in most
99
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cases there would not be any reporting of such transactions to tax
authorities. Finally, the funds in the Caymans account can then be
used for investments in the United States and in other high tax juris
dictions, and there would generally be no withholding taxes on the
resulting investment income, no Caymans taxes, and no informa
tion on the true identity of the holder available to the IRS or any
other tax authority (Blum

2005).

Significantly, other than the use of

the Caymans, both the underlying funds that were deposited in the
Guardian accounts, and the investment income, were generally
purely domestic transactions, and the tax evaded was U.S. income
tax on U.S. source income beneficially owned by U.S. residents.
The ability to use the Caymans and other offshore tax havens to
evade income taxes is a relatively recent phenomenon. Since about 1980
there has been a dramatic lowering of both legal and technological bar
riers to the movement of capital, goods, and services. As countries have
relaxed their tariffs and capital controls, much of the world economy
has shifted from goods to services, and electronic means of delivering
services and transferring funds have developed. At the same time, the
tools used by tax administrations to combat tax evasion have not changed
significantly: Most tax administrations are limited to enforcing taxes
within their jurisdiction, and for international transactions, can only rely
on outdated mechanisms like exchange of information under tax trea
ties with other high-tax countries, which are unavailing for income earned
through tax haven corporations. Simply put, we have the technology
that enables people to conduct their affairs without regard to national
borders and without transparency, while restricting tax collectors to geo
graphic borders, that are meaningless in today's world.
This chapter focuses on the problem of closing the "international
tax gap," defined as the portion of taxes owed but not collected
from U.S. taxpayers when an international connection of some type
hinders the IRS. For example, a U.S. business owner selling goods
abroad over the Internet can direct her foreign correspondent to
deposit the sale proceeds in a Swiss bank account.

Or a U.S. resi

dent (like the Guardian depositors) can shift funds to a Caymans
corporation and the corporation can lend these funds back to the
United States and earn interest income. In neither case will there be
withholding or automatic information reporting to the IRS, and as a
result, it is unlikely that the IRS will be able to collect the tax due.
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The size of the international tax gap
The Unites States legitimately boasts one on the world's higher com
pliance rates for tax collections. However, most of the taxes collected
by the IRS are from income that is subject either to withholding at the
source (e.g., wages) or to automatic information reporting to the IRS
by financial institutions (e.g., interest or dividends from U.S. payors).
The IRS has recently estimated that in 2001 there was a total "tax gap"
(i.e., a difference between the taxes it collected and the taxes it should
have collected under existing law) of between
or about

16%

of total taxes owed (IRS

2005).

$312

and

$353

billion,

A large portion of this

gap results from income that is subject to neither withholding nor in
formation reporting, such as most income of small businesses and in
come earned from foreign payors. For these types of income, the com
pliance rate falls from over

90%

to under

70%

(Aaron and Slemrod

2004).
No one, including the IRS, has a good estimate of the size of the
international tax gap.

This is not surprising given that the activities

involved are illegal, but one can make an educated guess based on a few
publicly available numbers. In

2003,

the Boston Consulting Group es

timated that the total holdings of cash deposits and listed securities by
high net worth individuals in the world were
these,
these
with,

$38

trillion, and that of

$ 16.2 trillion were held by residents of North America. Out of
$ 16.2 trillion, "less than" 10% was held offshore (as compared
for example, 20-30% offshore for Europe and 50-70% offshore

for Latin America and the Middle East) (Dyer, De Juniac, Holley, and
Aerni

2004).

If one translates this estimate into approximately

$ 1.5

trillion held

offshore by U.S. residents, and if one assumes that the amount held
offshore earns 10% annually, the international component of the tax gap
would be the tax on

$150

billion a year, or about

$50

billion.

This

figure is in the mid-range of estimates of the international tax gap in

2002

($40 billion)
($70 billion) (Sullivan 2004). As an
order of magnitude, an estimate of $50 billion for the total international
tax gap (for each tax year) appears congruent with the $3.2 billion ac
by former IRS Commissioner Charles 0. Rossotti

and by IRS consultant Jack Blum

tual recovery by the IRS from a single Cayman bank (for multiple tax
years).
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This estimate suggests that the international tax gap (i.e., illegal
tax evasion by mostly individual U.S. taxpayers through cross-bor
der activities) may be significantly greater than the total corporate
tax gap, i.e., the underpayment of corporate taxes due to tax shel
ters, transfer pricing, and other tax avoidance activities, which the
IRS has estimated at about

$29.9

billion for

2001

(IRS

2005).

And

yet, as we will discuss below, the IRS expends far more resources
on the corporate tax gap than on the international tax gap.

Why the International tax gap is a problem
Why should we care about the international tax gap? When the Organi
zation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) began its
crackdown on tax havens in

1998,

Dan Mitchell of the Heritage Foun

dation criticized it as a group of bloated welfare states ganging up as a
cartel to quash the small, defenseless Caribbean islands that depend on
offshore banking activities for their livelihood. The tax havens, it was
argued, are needed to protect the property of residents of non-demo
cratic countries from confiscation by tyrants.

And the availability

of low-or no-tax offshore centers serves as a salutary check on the
tendency of rich country governments to increase taxes (Center for
Freedom and Prosperity

2001).

However, even thoughtful supporters of tax competition like Julie
Roin acknowledge that this argument is problematic when it is applied
to illegal tax evasion by citizens of democratic countries (Roin

2001).

After all, the desirable size of the public sector in those countries, in
cluding the United States, is the key political issue of our times, which
is fought and re-fought every few years at the ballot box. Once the
citizens have determined by their votes what mix of government pro
grams they would like to pay for through their taxes, it seems perverse
to argue that some of them can then legitimately opt out of participation
in the process by evading the law and stashing their income overseas,
away from the reach of the tax collector. After all, those citizens do not
actually move to the offshore tax havens, thereby subjecting themselves
to a much lower quantity and quality of government services. Instead,
they stay at home and continue to enjoy the level of services provided
by the rich country government, but refuse to pay their fair share of the
cost (for elaboration, see Avi-Yonah

2000).
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It is important to distinguish such illegal tax evasion activities by
individual residents of high-tax countries from tax competition.2

Tax

competition is healthy, for example, where it increases government
efficiency and the development of sound tax policies that maximize
economic development while financing necessary government pro
grams. In this way, tax competition reduces the tax burden.
None of the steps taken by the OECD, nor the ones proposed
below, involve forcing the tax havens to collect taxes for OECD mem
ber countries. Rather, they involve cooperation in exchange for in
formation, similar to what is already done voluntarily in other con
texts that require such cooperation (such as the fight against
international terrorism and drug cartels). Otherwise, all the suggested
steps can be taken unilaterally by OECD members without discrimi
nation and without harming the sovereignty of the tax havens.
The United States is currently facing significant budget deficits
that are likely to increase as costs of entitlement programs go up.
These deficits are increasing daily as a result of the ongoing "war
on terror" and natural disasters like Hurricanes Katrina and Rita.
Closing the tax gap by better enforcing current law is one deficit
cutting measure on which Republicans and Democrats may be able
to agree (see, e.g., Committee for Economic Development
a bipartisan group).

$300

(2005),

If the United States could collect an additional

billion per year (the total estimated tax gap), this would go a

long way to reduce the deficit; and even a significantly lower num
ber (presumably there will always be a tax gap) would be helpful
under current conditions.
Closing or reducing the tax gap would have an effect beyond the
revenue involved. A large part of the current unpopularity of the in
come tax has resulted from the perception that "only the little people
pay taxes." If the United States can improve its collections from the
rich, everyone will feel better about paying their fair share. This would
ease some of the pressure from the income tax and enable a debate about
replacing it with another kind of tax in a less acrimonious atmosphere.
Taxpayers should not be forced to adopt a different kind of tax system
because of the unwillingness (not inability) to enforce existing law, nor
should taxpayers decide for themselves how much tax they would like
to pay by using the loopholes in existing law to their benefit (Com
mittee for Economic Development

2005).
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Solutions to the international tax gap
Following are five steps that can be taken on a bipartisan basis to help
close the international tax gap:
1. Increased IRS enforcement
It is well known that the IRS has in recent years faced an increased
workload with diminished resources.

From

1992

"full-time equivalent" staff decreased by about

2001, the IRS
20,000 positions.
to

This trend has been reversed more recently, but as former IRS Com
missioner Rossotti has written, the increase is not enough to keep
up with the increase in complexity of the tax system and the size of
the economy (Rossotti

2004).

In recent years, Congress has repeat

edly increased the complexity of U.S. tax law without adding fund
ing to the IRS. Bipartisan groups like the Committee for Economic
Development (CED) have recently called for more resources and
political support to be given to the IRS (CED

2005).

Decreased resources have forced the IRS to focus its attention on
certain areas and neglect others, and predictably, the areas receiving the
most attention have been those in the political limelight, such as the
Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC) (under pressure from Republicans)
and corporate tax shelters (under pressure from Democrats). However,
these are not necessarily the areas likely to generate the most "bang for
the buck" in terms of closing the tax gap. EITC fraud involves small
amounts, and corporate tax shelters are very difficult to audit and have
frequently been upheld by courts upon review. While the United States
should continue its effort to combat corporate tax shelters, increased
international enforcement could be even more efficient in eliminating
the tax gap.
The IRS should dedicate more resources to attempting to close the
international tax gap. In particular, the IRS should give more priority,
and be given more resources, to audit compliance with existing laws
requiring U.S. taxpayers to report ownership of foreign bank accounts
and stock in foreign corporations. Moreover, the IRS should focus on
auditing businesses relying on e-commerce in overseas transactions,
which are particularly susceptible to abuse. If the Mathewson case is
any indication, such increased attention may generate many dollars in
tax revenue for every dollar spent on enforcement.3
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2. Bilateral information exchange
The United States currently has bilateral information exchange agree
ments with several tax haven jurisdictions. However, most of the exist
ing agreements are restricted only to criminal matters. Criminal matters
are a very small part of overall tax collections, and pose very difficult
evidentiary issues in the international context.

Moreover, the agree

ments sometimes require the subject matter to be criminal in both the
United States and the tax haven, which would never be the case for pure
tax evasion. In addition, they typically require the United States to make
a specific request relating to particular individuals, and they also typi
cally do not override bank secrecy provisions in tax haven laws. These
limitations mean that existing tax information exchange agreements,
while helpful and important in some cases, are of limited value in clos
ing the overall international tax gap.
The OECD has recently modified Article 26 (Exchange of Informa
tion) in its model income tax treaty, and has adopted a model Tax Infor
mation Exchange Agreement (TIEA), both of which are intended to
address all of these problems. Under the new Article

26

and model

TIEA, exchange of information is automatic (rather than just by
request), relates to civil as well as criminal tax liabilities, does not
require "dual criminality" or suspicion of a crime other than tax
evasion, and overrides bank secrecy provisions in domestic laws.
The United States should renegotiate its existing tax treaties and
exchange of information agreements to incorporate all the changes
made by the OECD in its model treaty and TIEA.
Below is a discussion of the steps needed to induce tax haven juris
dictions to negotiate such agreements with the United States. For other
jurisdictions that are not tax havens, the inducement is the information
they can obtain from the United States on their own residents. To en
sure such information is available, the Treasury should finalize regula
tions proposed by the Clinton Administration that require U.S. banks
and financial institutions to collect information on interest payments
made to overseas jurisdictions when the interest itself is exempt
from withholding under the portfolio interest exemption (Blum

2005).

The Treasury has recently proposed to limit such regula

tions to

16

designated countries, but as Blum writes, there is no

legitimate privacy or other reason to impose such limitations.

The

banks should collect all the information, and the Treasury should
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use its existing authority not to exchange it in situations in which it
might be misused by non-democratic foreign governments (e.g . ,
when freedom fighters use U.S. bank accounts).

3. Cooperation with the OECD
Current Treasury policy, possibly a reflection of broader foreign poli
cies, is to focus on bilateral agreements to obtain needed information
exchange cooperation. However, the OECD has been at the forefront of
persuading tax haven jurisdictions to cooperate with information ex
change, and is an organization that the United States had traditionally
played a leading role in and whose work benefits both governments and
the private sector. The United States should cooperate with the OECD
and other appropriate international and regional organizations in their
efforts to improve information exchange and, in particular, to persuade
the tax havens of the world to enter into bilateral information exchange
agreements based on the OECD model. The OECD has made signifi
cant progress since it began focusing on this issue in

1998,

but more

needs to be done, both on persuading laggard jurisdictions to cooperate
and on increasing the level of information exchange available from co
operating jurisdictions.

4. Incentives to tax havens
The United States should adopt a carrot-and-stick approach to tax ha
vens in order to provide incentives to cooperate with information ex
change. In particular, the United States and other donor countries, as
well as multilateral and regional organizations, should increase aid of a
type that would enable tax havens to shift their economies from reliance
on the offshore sector to other sources of income.
The common perception that the benefits of being a tax haven flow
primarily to residents of the tax haven is misguided. The financial ben
efits of tax haven operations, while funding a minimal level of govern
ment services, often flow primarily to professionals providing banking
and legal services, many of whom (like Mr. Mathewson) live in rich
countries, rather than to the often needy residents of the tax havens.
Thus, with some transitional support, most tax havens would likely see
the welfare of their own residents improve as they wean themselves
from dependence on the offshore sector.

Closing the international tax gap
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5. Sanctions on non-cooperating tax havens
In the case of non-cooperating tax havens, the U.S. Treasury should
use its existing authority to prospectively deny the benefits of the
portfolio interest exemption to countries that do not provide ad
equate exchange of information.4 This step is necessary to prevent
non-cooperating tax havens from aiding U.S. residents to evade
U.S. income tax.
A principal problem of dealing with tax havens is that if even a few
of them do not cooperate with information exchange, tax evaders are
likely to shift their funds there from cooperating jurisdictions, thereby
rewarding the non-cooperating ones and deterring others from coopera
tion. Thus, some jurisdictions have advertised their refusal to cooperate
with the OECD efforts.
However, if the political will existed, the tax haven problem could
easily be resolved by the rich countries through their own action. The
key observation here is that funds cannot remain in tax havens and be
productive; they must be reinvested into the rich and stable economies
of the world (which is why some laundered funds that need to remain
in the havens earn a negative interest rate). If the rich countries could
agree, they could eliminate the tax havens' harmful activities over
night by, for example, refusing to allow deductions for payments to
designated non-cooperating tax havens or restricting the ability of fi
nancial institutions to provide services with respect to tax haven op
erations.
The financial services industry will no doubt lobby hard against
such a step on the grounds that it will induce investors to shift funds to
another OECD member country. However, the European Union and
Japan have both committed to taxing their residents on foreign-source
interest income. The EU Savings Directive, in particular, requires all
EU members to cooperate in exchange of information or impose a
withholding tax on interest paid to EU residents (EU

2003).

Both the

EU and Japan would like to extend this treatment to income from the
United States. Thus, this would seem an appropriate moment to coop
erate with other OECD member countries by imposing a withholding
tax on payments to tax havens that cannot be induced to cooperate in
exchange of information, without triggering a flow of capital out
of the United States.
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Conclusion
The international tax gap is a significant component of the overall tax
gap and may in fact be larger than some components that have attracted
more public and IRS attention, like corporate tax shelters or EITC fraud.
In order to maintain any kind of tax system, the U.S. public needs to be
confident that current law can be enforced and that tax evasion will be
caught and prosecuted. Bipartisan support is needed for taking the steps
identified above to close the international tax gap. These steps offer the
potential of raising additional revenue without raising taxes, and of lev
eling the playing field between ordinary Americans who pay their fair
share of taxes and others who do not.
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Endnotes
1.

We would like to thank Henry Aaron, Max Sawicky, Eric Toder, and Philip West

for their extremely valuable comments on earlier versions of this chapter. Any remaining
errors are our responsibility.
2.

Tax competition is the use by governments (localities, states, or nations) of preferential

tax treatment-reduced rates or some sort of deduction, credit, or exclusion-to attract
taxable activity to their jurisdictions.
3.

For example, transfers by U.S. banks to foreign banks, such as occurred in the

Mathewson case, generate bank records which can be audited by the IRS. Similar records
may not exist for transfers from foreign banks or non-bank networks (e.g., the hawala
trust-based network). T hese types of transfers are also used by terrorists and it would be
advisable to use the well-developed expertise of the IRS to combat both tax evasion and
terrorist financing activities.
Similarly, more use can be made of credit card records and other data mining
techniques to establish which U.S. taxpayers have foreign accounts that they have not
disclosed (as required by current law) on their tax return.
4.

See Internal Revenue Code section 87 l(h)(6).
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